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Abstract  
Undocumented migrants frequently hire border crossing experts, called “coyotes” to facilitate a 
successful, safer crossing. U.S. border enforcement actively counters these migrants. U.S. 
measures of enforcement and coyote fees grew together during the 20th century, suggesting a 
connection between enforcement and the coyote market. This paper tests the effect of border 
patrol agents and operations on coyote fees using a dataset compiled from the Mexican 
Migration Project, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, the Department of Homeland Security, 
and the United States Sentencing Commission. I do not find a significant connection between 
coyote fees and border enforcement, but do show that average prison time along the border 
acted as a shifter of supply prior to 2005. 
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I. Introduction  
Along the U.S.-Mexico border, undocumented, or “illegal,” immigrants1 cross by night, forge 
legal documents, or engage in other skill-intensive activities in order to avoid detection by border patrol 
agents and reach higher wages in United States. Migrants who secure employment send home 
remittances, which are critical to household budgets and wider development (Stark and Bloom 1985; 
Durand, Massey & Zenteno 2001). Additionally, undocumented migration increases the integration of 
the southern United States and northern Mexican labor markets (Cortez and Islas-Carmargo 2009). 
Meanwhile, the United States government crafts policies aiming to reduce the flow of unauthorized 
migration in an effort to “secure the border.” Policies have included increases to the number of border 
patrol agents, implementation of surveillance technologies and a push for a border-wide wall. 
To facilitate a successful crossing, many migrants hire experts, known as “coyotes.”  (Gathmann 
2008; Orrenius 2001). Coyotes are highly skilled in avoiding apprehension by border patrol agents and 
navigating treacherous areas like the Sonora Desert safely (Cornelius 2001). It follows that increasing 
border enforcement would raise demand for coyote services. 
Following this link between enforcement and demand, Kyle and Koslowski (2001) argue that 
border enforcement policies increase the profitability and scale of the multi-billion dollar human 
smuggling industry.  In the last thirty years, the average fee for coyote services has nearly quadrupled 
alongside the number of agents and time spent watching the border. This assumed theoretical link is 
also used in analysis of migration patterns. Orrenius (1999) uses border enforcement to instrument for 
coyote costs to show that coyotes increased migration beyond the level expected due to the U.S.-
                                                          
1 
In this article I use “immigrants” and “migrants” interchangeably. This is because my study encompasses cyclical migrants and 
one-time relocating immigrants. 
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Mexico wage differential. As further evidence of this theory, coyote fees may also explain the 
persistence of this wage differential, within the theoretical framework of wage convergence.2  
The share of Mexican migrants in the U.S. foreign-born population grew from 5.9 percent in 
1960 to 30.1 percent in 2008. Additionally, an estimated 62 percent of unauthorized U.S. migrants in 
2009 were Mexican.3 Does booming migration explain the rising coyote prices? Recent migration trends 
call that into question, opening the alternative explanation that U.S. enforcement policies drive coyote 
prices. 
The number of migrants from Mexico fell from 350,000 in 2006 to 150,000 at the end of The 
Great Recession in 2009.4,5 The average coyote fee continued to rise during these years despite this drop 
in market size. Either the supply of coyotes has decreased or a greater proportion of migrants have been 
hiring a coyote. The Mexican Migration Project (MMP), which forms the majority of my dataset, reveals 
that a higher percentage of this shrinking migrant pool hired coyotes. I use U.S. border enforcement to 
explain these apparent shifts in the supply and demand of the market for coyote services. 
Increased U.S. border enforcement could cause shifts in both supply and demand in the coyote 
market. The fee for coyote services fell throughout the mid-20th century, until the early 1990s, when 
the Clinton administration supported increases to border enforcement. These measures and others in 
recent years increased the budget and staffing of United States border patrol and targeted popular 
crossing zones.  It is critical to note that coyote fees continued to fall after the Immigration Control and 
                                                          
2
 Robertson & Halliday (working paper) document a persistent wage gap between the United States and Mexico across Age and 
education cohorts (Robertson & Halliday, working paper). This is in spite of the high level of integration between the U.S. and 
Mexican economies, which Robertson (2000) and Cortez and Islas-Carmargo (2009) show using reactions to wage shocks and 
convergence to an equilibrium differential. Robertson’s (2005) follow-up study on NAFTA indicates that border enforcement 
prevents further integration.  
3
 Reported by Migration Information Source. Terrazas, A. 2010. “Mexican Immigrants in the United States.” Migration 
Information Source.  < http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=767> . 
4 
As described in The New York Times article Preston (2009, May 14). “Mexican Data Show Migration to U.S. in Decline.” 
5
 Reported by Migration Information Source.  
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Reform Act (IRCA) of 1986. The law increased the penalty for hiring undocumented migrants and was 
the first of many anti-undocumented immigration measures. Donato, Durand, and Massey (1992) found 
that the IRCA did not change undocumented-migration practices between 1987 and 1989. Following 
these findings, it appears that the coyote market is only sensitive to enforcement along the border 
proper. Policies that target enforcement along the border may affect the coyote market more than in-
country immigration policies.   
Andreas (1996) argues that free trade policies like the North American Free Trade Agreement 
passed in 1994 contrast with tight border enforcement policies and bolster the coyote market. Several 
scholars have linked enforcement to migration indicators including migrant skill-levels, location choice, 
Mexican wages, volatility of remittances, and total welfare.6 Yet the wider literature shows a weak 
relationship between enforcement and prices (Gathmann 2008). This paper takes this finding one step 
further and shows an overall insignificant relationship between enforcement and costs. 
It is common in the literature to frame the coyote market as a standard economic market with 
supply and demand schedules (Gathmann 2008). Most border enforcement policies and operations can 
be tied to either the demand or supply side of the coyote market. Operations that aim to deter migrants, 
like Operation Hold The Line, shift the demand for coyote services outward. Others, like Operation 
Disruption, target coyotes and shift the supply of their services inward. If effective, all these policies 
should increase coyote fees, while ineffectual policies would not affect the market. Given the rising 
                                                          
6
 Enforcement also appears to increase the skill levels of Mexican migrants (Orrenius and Zavodny 2005). Likewise, Robertson, 
Hanson and Spilimbergo (2002) argue that increasing enforcement does not protect U.S. workers, but creates some negative 
impact on Mexican wages along the border. Mandelman and Zlate (2012) show that increased enforcement has greater welfare 
losses on unskilled migrant households and increases the volatility of wages and remittances for migrants using macroeconomic 
indicators from the United States and Mexico. Robertson (2005) showed that enforcement lowered the benefits of NAFTA for 
Mexican worker wages that were documented in trade flows. Borjas (1999) argued in favor of enforcement estimating that 
lowering immigration flows causes negligible changes to total surplus in the United States.  Borjas (2000) uses a recent estimate 
by Powell (2010) that immigration causes a 0.2 % change in total surplus, which is negligible given the size of the U.S. economy. 
Powell (2012) argues that the U.S. economy suffers substantial rent seeking losses from voter-driven increases in enforcement 
policies (2012). 
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percentage of coyote use, migrant operations likely dominated. This paper parses out how U.S. border 
policies concerning enforcement and prison time for unauthorized immigration contribute to the coyote 
fee. Using sector-specific data for number of agents per mile as a proxy for enforcement, average prison 
time and dummy variables for types of operations, I find that enforcement and operations are 
insignificant across almost every specification. 
I use Lopez-Castro’s (1998) overview of the coyote business model to classify operations that 
target coyotes. The suppliers of coyote services can be classified into one of three business types: local 
agents, local and border smugglers, and border-only smuggling businesses. Local agents gather groups 
of migrants and smuggle them across without taking formal leadership of the group. If the group is 
deported, they try again until successful. Local and border coyotes work similarly, but often require 
some connection to their migrants. Border-only smuggling businesses use a network of safe houses and 
vehicles to offer a superior service to migrants who can pay higher premiums.  
Existing literature models coyote use with one of three methods: as debt-financed migration, a 
Nash equilibrium decision, or within a supply and demand framework. Friebel and Guriev (2006) argue 
that coyotes facilitate indebted labor agreements, allowing migrants without means to immigrate as 
indentured servants. Enforcement would increase migration costs and the overall pool of migrants 
without the means to hire coyotes. Halliday and Paula (2013, forthcoming) create a Nash equilibrium 
framework and estimate how different enforcement policies and migrant expectations affect the 
decision to hire a coyote. Both models neglect the supply-side effects of border enforcement. 
 Gathmann (2008) draws on the supply function of criminals (Becker 1968) and migrant decision 
models to create a supply and demand model for coyote services. She isolates supply and demand 
shocks within the market using changes in border enforcement, measured in linewatch hours, and 
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coyote jail time. She estimates the price elasticity of enforcement to be between 17 and 31 percent. My 
results do not show the same relationship from 1995-2005, as well as through 2011. 
 Gathmann (2008) also uses an instrumental variable to account for possible endogeneity 
between enforcement and coyote prices. An increase in undocumented crossers will bolster demand, 
but also require more enforcement. Bohn and Pugatch (2013) claim that administrative delays within 
various government departments create two-year lags to enforcement changes. Although this should 
remove endogeneity, Gathmann (2008) and I find statistical endogeneity. Gathmann (2008) uses the 
Drug and Enforcement Agency (DEA) budget to instrument for enforcement hours. I do not use the DEA 
budget, as the data are not sector-specific.  
In order to get a sector-specific instrumental variable, I follow Bohn and Pugatch (2013) and 
create sector-specific weighted averages of unemployment rates. Bohn and Pugatch (2013) use sector-
specific weighted averages of migrants’ destination cities to determine the effect of enforcement on 
location choice. Ideally, my instrumental variable would account for herd and network effects7 from 
migrant families and their communities (Bauer, Epstein, and Gang 2002). Unfortunately, there are few 
reliable measures of these effects. Instead, I instrument the choice to migrate with the unemployment 
rates in Mexican origin cities and U.S. destination cities. I use a sector-weighted average of 
unemployment rate to instrument for coyote costs. Identification tests reveal that this is a poor 
instrument, so I discount most of the instrumented results.  
Additionally, I deviate from Gathmann (2008) by estimating a reduced form equation instead of 
a hedonic price equation. She instruments for shifts in supply using data on prison sentences. I include 
                                                          
7
 Herd effects measure likelihood of migrating with those around you. Network effects represent the assistance from previous 
migrants. 
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them in a reduced form empirical setup, detailed below. This model reveals that prison time create 
statistically significant changes in coyote fees because the variable is a primary shifter of coyote supply. 
 This paper builds on the literature by showing that the relationship between enforcement and 
coyote fees is not significant for recent years. I accomplish this by categorizing relevant border 
enforcement operations, which serves as a secondary contribution to the literature. Additionally, I show 
that the average prison time for unauthorized immigration creates significant changes to coyote fees as 
a shifter of supply. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, I categorize the U.S. border 
operations into three groups. Following that I outline my theoretical model, which blends models for the 
decision to migrate and the decision to supply criminal services. Then, I describe the unique factors of 
my dataset, which is compiled from the MMP and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Last, I 
analyze the results from statistical model and close with concluding remarks. 
II. Context and Categorization of Border Operations 
During the 1920s, the United States Customs & Border Protection (CBP) divided the U.S.-Mexico 
border into nine sectors of varying length: Rio Grande Valley (320 miles), Laredo (171 miles), Del Rio 
(210 miles), Big Bend (510 miles), El Paso (268 miles), Tucson (262 miles), Yuma (126 miles), El Centro 
(70 miles), and San Diego (60 miles), pictured in Figure 1. Despite hiring border personnel as early as 
1924, the U.S. government maintained relatively passive immigration policies until 1986 with the 
passage of the IRCA. There have been three waves of immigration policy: targeting in-country migrants 
during the 1980s, “catch and release” during the 1990s, and the prosecution of undocumented migrants 
during the last decade.8 Each wave featured a unique set of operations aimed at reducing 
undocumented migration. 
                                                          
8 Information provided by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Retrieved from: http://www.cbp.gov/about/history  
9 
 
 
9 
Most operations focused on apprehending migrants along the border, which I categorize as 
migrant-specific operations.  In response, more migrants hired coyotes to facilitate safer and successful 
border crossings (Gathmann 2008). Other operations aimed to disrupt coyote networks, making it more 
difficult for coyotes to smuggle unauthorized migrants. I categorize these as coyote-specific operations.  
These operations alter the objectives of border patrol agents and possibility the effect of enforcement 
on the coyote market. Other operations altered the probability that an undocumented migrant or 
coyote would face prison time, which I label prison operations.  I categorize thirty border operations for 
use in my theoretical and quantitative analysis. A comprehensive list of these categorizations can be 
found in Table 1. 
 The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 marked the beginning of the first wave. 
This legalized over 3 million undocumented migrants within the country and increased the penalties for 
businesses caught hiring undocumented workers (Donato, Durand, & Massey1992). Migration did not 
fall, however; it continued to grow despite this supposed decrease in U.S. demand for undocumented 
labor. Many migrants headed north to gain citizenship with a recently IRCA-documented family member.  
 In response to this continued growth in migration, the Clinton administration backed operations 
aiming to stop undocumented migration at the border. These operations included Hold The Line in El 
Paso, Gatekeeper in San Diego, Safeguard in Tucson and Rio Grande in Texas and started in 1993, 1994, 
1995, and 1997, respectively. These “catch and release” operations were named because agents 
deported all migrants caught on the border back to Mexico, regardless of nationality. To improve the 
probability of apprehension, the CBP invested in additional agents, lighting, and night and lowlight vision 
goggles. 
10 
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Given the emphasis on the apprehension of migrants, I categorize these operations as migrant-
specific. Migrant-specific operations encourage agents to focus on finding undocumented migrants 
along the border, decreasing the chance that migrants cross the border successfully. As a result, it is 
theorized that more migrants would hire a coyote to facilitate the clandestine activities necessary to 
avoid apprehension. This would imply that migrant-specific operations increase the demand for coyote 
services.  
 Yet there were also several operations that targeted coyotes and their supporting organizations 
during the Clinton years. CBP implemented a Biometric Identification System, which aimed to identify 
criminals and repeat migrants during the apprehension process. This would have improved the 
probability of sending local coyotes that attempt to blend in with the migrant groups they lead to jail 
(Lopez-Castro 1998). Therefore, I consider it a prison-specific operation. Additionally, in 1995 the San 
Diego sector initiated Operation Disruption, which had the stated goal to deter and dismantle existing 
coyote networks. Unfortunately, this operation can only be found as a cursory mention in existing 
reports and the government does not have reports on this operation publicly available for evaluation.9  
 Last, the Clinton years saw a largely unsuccessful push for a well-maintained border fence. 
Although most of the San Diego sector had fencing by the end of 2000, the rest of the border did not. A 
second push found success with the passage of the Secure Border Initiative 2005. Between 2006 and 
2014, the DHS built 600 miles of fencing. Fencing creates a shift in both supply and demand, but it is 
built throughout the year. 10 Therefore, I cannot include it in my quantitative analysis of annual migrant-
trips. 
                                                          
9
 A Freedom of Information Act is currently being processed through the CBP for access to documentation on this and several 
other operations. 
10 Information accessed through CBP Report. Retrieved from: http://nemo.cbp.gov/borderpatrol/2435_southwest.pdf  
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 During the Bush administration, immigration was included into the newly-formed DHS. The DHS 
took a harsher line to migration and replaced “catch and release” with automatic prosecution of all 
unauthorized crossers (Lydgate 2010). In 2005, the Del Rio sector introduced Operation Streamline, 
which mandated the prosecution of all undocumented peoples caught within a 100-mile radius of the 
city of Del Rio. First-time migrants typically face between 15 and 30 days of jail time. Similar operations 
spread to Tucson, Yuma and throughout Texas by 2008. Since these alter the probability of facing prison 
time, I interact them with the average prison time in my quantitative analysis. I expect that these 
operations to increase the demand for coyote services as migrants face a higher likelihood of prison 
time. This change in prosecution procedure creates an identification issue, which I address in estimation 
issues. 
 In recent years the CBP and DHS has also targeted specific hiding locations and methods for 
coyotes. For example, in 2009 the DHS cleared the Carrizo Cane along the Rio Grande in the Laredo 
sector.11 Following that, the DHS filled Smuggler’s Gulch – a popular canyon for crossing, two miles from 
the Pacific Ocean between Tijuana and San Diego – with 2 million cubic yards of dirt (Beaubien 2009). 
Without hiding places, more migrants hire coyotes, creating an outward shift in demand. Yet coyotes 
also face increased costs to smuggling, so supply shifts inward. Together these shifts would increase 
price. Additionally, several blitz operations like the Human Smuggling Take Down targeted smuggling 
safe houses in the United States, where undocumented migrants stay while coyotes arrange 
accommodations in the states. A reduction in these houses, an input to smuggling, would reduce the 
supply of coyote services. 
                                                          
11 Information provided in CBP report: Border Construction and Support Facilities.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/border-construction 
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 The chart shows that Tucson, El Paso and San Diego have experienced the most border 
operations and several sectors like Yuma and Big Bend do not experiences any sector-specific operations. 
Likewise, most of the border operations targeted at least migrants. The few that targeted coyotes often 
also affected migrants, creating an identification issue, which I resolve in section V. 
 Having established and categorized the enforcement operations, I can move into my theoretical 
model. After that I can perform a quantitative analysis and evaluate of the success of these operations. 
III.   Theory and Empirical Model 
My theory simplifies the Gathmann (2008) model. The primary simplification is the assumption 
that individuals’ wage differential is not determined by their border-crossing skill parameter. Instead, 
wage is specific to a cohort based on age and education, which simplifies the theoretical and empirical 
analysis. 
Migration theories can account for enforcement in two different ways. In the Harris-Todaro 
model, enforcement decreases the likelihood of reaching and finding a job in the United States (Harris, 
Todaro 1970). Yet, Sjaastad (1962) would describe enforcement as a cost of crossing the border. Both 
theories inform my characterization of coyotes. In my model, coyotes increase the expected benefit of 
migration because they improve the probability of a successful crossing while also increasing the 
pecuniary costs of crossing the border. 
 I represent coyote supply with the criminal supply function (Becker 1968). Criminals are willing 
and able to supply services when compensated for their opportunity costs, which are measured in 
alternative wages, the expected cost of punishment, and their standard marginal cost. In the case of a 
coyote, the expected costs and probability of apprehension are functions of enforcement hours.  
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Following Gathmann (2008), I assume that coyotes act in a perfectly competitive market. This 
assumption is substantiated by the anecdotal evidence that most border towns are full of several former 
coyotes of equal skill levels and minimal differentiation of services. In perfect competition, the price of 
coyote service is set equal to these costs: 
                 ( )    ( )     (1) 
 Where PE is the price an expert charges, L represents border enforcement, altw is the alternative 
wage that a coyote could earn, probE is the probability of being apprehended and receiving fine F and C 
is a cost function of L. This gives the supply function: 
        (           
     )      (2) 
 Using the implicit function theorem12, we can rewrite quantity as a function of price and the 
variables that determine price: 
   (             
     )       (3) 
 The demand side requires a longer derivation. Gathmann (2008) depicts a skill parameter,  , 
which determines the human capital specific to crossing the border. This parameter is distributed across 
the population using a standard distribution function:  ( ). The likelihood that a migrant crosses 
successfully is a function of   and the enforcement, L, along the border. The probability that a migrant is 
apprehended is always greater than that faced by a coyote as shown in the following equation 
        ( )      (   )         (4) 
 where the probability of being apprehended is a monotonically increasing S function bounded 
by probE below and one above. 
 Migrants have the option to cross the border alone or hire a coyote, essentially purchasing a 
lesser probability of apprehension. If their skill-level is high enough, they may migrate alone if coyotes 
                                                          
12
 Implicit function theorem requires that the partial derivatives can be set equal to some non-zero function. 
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are too expensive. Lower skill-level migrants may still demand coyote services at a high price level if the 
benefit of reaching the United States exceeds these traveling costs. 
 A migrant’s decision to hire an expert is modeled by the following comparison of the returns to 
migration: 
(       ( ))(     ( ))       ( )   (      (   ))       (   )   (5) 
 where    is the expected wage differential between the Mexico and U.S. and F is the possible 
repercussion for a migrant which we assume is equal to zero because migrants are usually deported. 
This assumption is broken after 2005, which I discuss further with other estimation issues. Here I deviate 
from Gathmann (2008). She assumes that the wage differential is dependent on  , such that migrants’ 
border-crossing skill transfers into their job-specific human capital. This creates a lower bound  * for the 
decision to migrate to the United States. Instead, I assume that the wage differential is cohort-specific 
and remove the lower bound on  *.  
When the inequality shown in (5) holds, a migrant essentially purchases the coyote’s probability 
of apprehension. Equation (6) shows (5) solved for cutoff probability of apprehension at which point a 
migrant will not choose to hire a coyote. 
     (   )  
  ( )      ( )  ( )
    
       ( )    (6) 
 In equation (7), I solve for the cutoff   * at which point a migrant will not hire a coyote by taking 
the inverse of the probability function for L held constant.13 
         (
          
    
       )      (7) 
 In equation (8) I integrate distribution function from 0 to    to solve for the total migrants that 
demand a coyote, which can be termed DE: 
                                                          
13 
The S-shaped probability function is invertible because it is monotically increasing. 
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 ∫  ( )  
  
 
  (  )             (8) 
 where DE measures the aggregate demand for coyote services and is a function of this skill level. 
Equation (9) shows quantity demanded as a function of the   , itself a function of price, enforcement, 
punishment the wage differential and a coyote’s probability of apprehension. 
     
 (  (               ))      (9) 
 using the implicit function theorem I rewrite this as: 
     
 (                  )      (10) 
 Now I take a linear approximation of supply and demand, which are shown in (11) and (12). Due 
to data restrictions, (12) does not include the alternate wage that a coyote could earn within a border 
town. I use these linear approximations to solve for a reduced form equation of price. 
   
                                             
   (   )            (   )                     (11) 
 
   
                                        
                                (12) 
 
where P represents price, F represents the average prison time for a coyote convicted of an 
immigration offense, Enf is enforcement measured in agents per mile, WgDif represents the cohort-
specific wage differential and OpCoy, OpMig and OpPris correspond to the number of operations 
targeting coyotes, migrants and likelihood of facing prison time. X is a vector of individual characteristics 
of the migrant-trip including age, education, and migration experience of the migrant, and whether the 
coyote smuggled an individual or a group. I include the latter term to account for differences between 
the types of coyotes outlined by Lopez-Castro (1998). These variables are regressed over t years, i 
individuals trips, j federal jurisdiction areas, k border patrol sectors and l age and education cohorts. 
These are then set equal to each other and solved for price. 
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 (     )  (     )                                         
              (     )                           
                      (           )    (13) 
  
For simplicity this can be written as: 
                                                   
              (     )                          
                                   (14) 
Enforcement is represented by three variables: agents per mile, the number of coyote-specific 
operations, and the number of migrant-specific operations. Agents per mile cause shifts in both supply 
and demand, because I assume additional agents increase the probability of apprehension and cost of 
crossings. I assume coyote-specific operations only affect coyotes and create exclusively supply-side 
shifts, while migrant-specific operations are exclusive to migrants demanding additional services. 
Operations are interacted with agents per mile, because I assume operations alter the stated goal of 
agents. 
 Similarly, I represent F with average prison sentence length, as a measure of magnitude, and 
prison-specific operations as a measure of the increased probability of facing prison time. A similar 
interaction term to enforcement is used here. In this analysis, I assume that migrants are deported 
instead of face prison time, as this was the norm before 2005. This identification strategy fails after 2005, 
which I handle in the estimation issues section.  
I perform a regression on equation (14) to capture the net effects of each of these variables on 
price.        is the net error term. I present the regression results below. First, I present results without 
any operations. Then I include measures of all three operations and their interaction terms.  
IV. Summary Statistics 
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My dataset combines annual data from the CBP, DHS, the United States Sentencing Commission 
(USSC) and survey data from the MMP. The CBP and the DHS provide the number of agents watching 
the border and the hours spent watching the border in each sector, respectively. I divide each of these 
by linear border sector miles to balance enforcement across sectors. The USSC offers the average length 
of prison terms for immigration offenses14 in the five federal court jurisdictions: Texas Southern, Texas 
Western, Arizona, New Mexico and California South, which include the nine sectors.15 
 The MMP database is a joint research initiative run by Princeton University and the University of 
Guadalajara. MMP uses ethnosurveys to gather sociological and economic data on households in 
communities that send migrants to the United States. The project surveys households with cyclical 
migrants and has surveyed 200 households in communities in Mexico from 1987 to 2013, with pilot 
studies in 1982, 1983 and 1985. The MMP provides sampling weights to account for the portion of the 
total population accounted for in the 200 households surveyed. Additionally, Massey and Zenteno 
(2000) show that MMP data are a representative sample of the overall population migrating from 
Mexico. 
 Surveys gather information on up to 25 crossings that an individual remembers. This creates a 
recall bias issue, so I remove all trips that occur more than ten years before the migrant was surveyed, 
following Gathmann (2008). Migrants report the year of crossing, where they crossed, whether they 
used a coyote, that coyote’s fee, who they crossed with, amount of times they were deported per 
crossing, and whether they were successful. Also, they record demographic data on education, sex and 
birth year of the migrant.  
                                                          
14
 These include undocumented migrations, as well as those assisting undocumented migrants. 
15
 Texas South includes the Rio Grande Valley and Texas Western includes Laredo, Del Rio and Marfa. New Mexico includes El 
Paso, while Arizona includes Yuma and Tucson. California Southern includes El Centro and San Diego. 
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 The summary statistics are reported in Table 2. All monetary values are reported in real 2005 
dollars. The migrant-specific information is reported in migrant-trips for which data were reported. The 
wage differential data are cohort-specific by age and education. Average prison time is presented by 
sector-year, while the enforcement variables are reported annually. 
Most of the migrants in my regression are male and between 20 and 40 years old and 1 and 9 
years of education.  In order to better represent the entire migrating population, MMP adds sampling 
weights. 
On the crossing level, we see that the majority of migrants took between one and eight trips 
during their time migrating and coyotes supported 75 percent of these trips. Migrants who used a 
coyote paid between $100 and $1600 on most trips. In a few cases, they paid nothing. 
The summary statistics show that there is a substantial gain in wages for most cohorts moving to 
the United States. This aligns with historical economic differences between these two countries and 
reveals a major motivation to migrate. 
The Crossed Alone variable measures whether migrants traveled alone, 0, or with a group, 1. On 
97.7 percent of trips, migrants did not cross alone. Following Gathmann (2008), I include this variable as 
a control to account for differences in pricing for smuggling multiple individuals. 
 In Table 3, I present the summary statistics for my specific regression. I regress from 1995 to 
2011, which the years of overlap for the prison, enforcement and wage differential data. Enforcement 
measures and months of prison are broken down by sector. 
Table 4 shows the data in my regression by sector. San Diego has the third cheapest average 
coyote costs, but the most agents and line watch hours per mile. I have more crossings in Yuma than in 
San Diego, since my regression does not include the years before 1995. This is not representative of 
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historical flows between Mexico and the United States. Instead it shows recent migratory shift in 
response to increased enforcement in San Diego. 
Additionally, these tables illustrate that the available data are highly uneven across sectors. For 
example Big Bend has only 3 total person-trips in the regression, but Tucson has 446 total person-
crossings. This means that I cannot perform a panel regression when regressing for the average sector 
coyote fee. 
Border linewatch hours, or the total time border patrol agents spend monitoring the border, are 
available from 1960 to 2010, while total agents are available from 1993 to 2013. Figure 2 shows that the 
two measures are highly correlated. This figure also shows that enforcement has grown exponentially 
since the IRCA over the last thirty years. This and other immigration policies and operations drove the 
changes in enforcement. 
Unfortunately, I cannot access data on linewatch hours at the sector-specific level after 1999. 
Robertson (2005) provides linewatch hours for 1963 and from 1977-1998. The CBP has not yet 
responded to a request for these data through the Freedom of Information Act. I calculate a measure for 
linewatch hours using the correlation between agents and hours during the 1992 and 1998 overlap. I 
extrapolate the missing years’ hours per mile by multiplying agents per mile in each year by the ratio of 
agents to linewatch hours during the overlap. 
Table 5 shows the correlation between these two variables during the 1992 to 1998 overlap.  
Agents and hours are highly correlated for the whole border and most of the sectors, except for Yuma. 
In Yuma there is little to no correlation. This changes when you restrict observations to just 1992-1997. 
Then Yuma increases to 0.5006, implying that the lack of correlation stems from changes in 1998. It is 
unclear why this disparity would exist, so I choose to exclude these data from my primary analysis. 
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Table 4 includes data on agents and linewatch hours to 2013. San Diego has the greatest density 
of agents between 1992 and 2013. Rio Grande Valley and Big Bend both received far less enforcement 
support, while other sectors had relatively equal enforcement. 
Next, I include several graphs of trends and relationships of the key variables. Figure 3 features 
the annual percentage of migrants using coyotes by the average real coyote fee. It shows an apparent 
upward sloping demand curve, but it does not control for wage differentials, border enforcement, 
punishment or other demand and supply shifters. The graph supports the hypothesis that demand for 
coyote services increased over time, leading to higher annual coyote use and fees. 
 Figures 4 and 5 show the growth of coyote fees and coyote use over time, respectively. Figure 4 
shows that linewatch hours and coyote fees increased together after the passage of the IRCA and 
subsequent border operations. Prior to the IRCA, average the average coyote fees was at a local 
minimum. 
Figure 5 shows that coyote use increased over time. In 1986, it flat-lined at 80 percent before 
increasing nearly monotonically after the passage of the Clinton-backed border operations, implying 
that border enforcement caused dominant shifts in demand. Figure 6 shows that coyote use grew in 
each sector. Likewise, sectors with a low density of enforcement operations like El Centro reached 100 
percent after those with high densities, like San Diego. 
 Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between coyote use and linewatch hours. As you can see, 
coyote use increases dramatically with linewatch hours. After that, the initial rise in demand stops, 
which explains the correlation between fees and enforcement over time. 
In order to explore the relationship between enforcement and coyote costs, it is important to 
look at separate sectors. Figure 8 shows changes to staffing per mile and average coyote cost over time 
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since 1992 with lines to denote several border initiatives. Staff increases are most notable in the 
geographically smallest sector, San Diego, with 60 miles of border to monitor. The other sectors had 
modest increases, with Tucson facing the most in recent year likely the result of the density of 
operations in Tucson. The other sectors experience minimal increases to staffing. Big Bend, the least 
popular sector for crossing and longest (510 miles), experiences just a slight increase over time. 
 Figure 9 shows that the average coyote fee rose to similar levels in each sector, which indicates 
that fees may have risen independently of specific operations. Instead, additional agents could foster 
increases to coyote fees. Figure 10 provides a visual aid for the increase to real coyote fees by sector 
and underreporting within the dataset. The bar charts show that average fees increased overall from 
1995 to 2013, but several sectors do not have data on fees for several years.  
Enforcement is highly correlated with the increase in coyote costs, yet the following analysis 
does not find evidence that enforcement creates shifts in demand or supply. In fact, the analysis fails to 
reject spurious correlation between pricing and enforcement. 
V. Results 
a. Estimation Issues  
Before presenting my results, I would like to discuss estimation issues and how I circumvented 
them. First off, I face limited data availability for the wage differential, agents per mile and average 
prison sentencing time. As a result, I am limited to studying the years 1995 to 2011. 
 Another issue is the disparity in reported observations based on the number of migrants in each 
border sector. For example in Big Bend, there only three recorded migrations between 1995 and 2011, 
while there are 288 in San Diego during the same time period. As a result, the average price in each 
sector is not reliable and unreported in several years. I perform regressions against individual trips, 
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which does not account for differences in enforcement within the same year. This lack of sub-annual 
specification contributes to the low R-squared values of my regressions. 
I also face one unique estimation issue for the years after 2005 when sectors in Arizona, New 
Mexico, and Texas ended “catch and release” in favor prosecuting all migrants. First-time offenders 
typically receive between 15 and 30 days in prison, with length increasing for each past violation. As a 
robustness check, I exclude observations following 2005 in my regression. My results prove robust and 
show that this policy change did not affect the analysis. 
 My analysis does face several standard regression issues. First, the range in coyote fees is not 
constant over time, which creates heteroskedasticity. I correct for this using robust standard errors. 
 I do not find multicollinearity (variance inflation factor < 5) for those regressions not containing 
dummy variables and interaction terms. Regressions that include dummy and interaction terms can be 
excluded given because interaction terms have overlapping values with agents per mile. 
I expected to find endogeneity between increased coyote demand and U.S. border enforcement 
as the government responds to increasing migration. Yet, Bohn and Pugatch (2013) argue that 
bureaucratic processes create a two-year delay between CBP budget outlays and changes to border 
enforcement, which would remove this endogeneity. I test for endogeneity with a sector-specific 
regression of the change in agents per mile by the change in undocumented migrants lagged zero, one, 
and two years. The results, presented in Table 6, show that an increase in undocumented migrants 
corresponds with a contemporaneous fall in agents per mile. In addition to being atheoretical, this 
negative relationship is likely spurious because the CBP assigns agents at the beginning of each year. Yet 
lagging migrants by one year is not statistically significant. Instead, lagging migrants two years is 
statistically significant and positive, in support of Bohn and Pugatch’s (2013) claim about bureaucratic 
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delays. These show that CBP enforcement policy fails to consider contemporary changes to 
undocumented migration.  
Yet, my results fail the Durbin Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity (F-stat = 5.18). To correct for 
this, I use an instrumental variable for the United States border enforcement policies. Ideally, this would 
be the annual CBP budget, but this information is not available by sector. Additionally, the government 
increases CBP funds in response to increased migration, so their budget is probably. Gathmann (2008) 
uses the budget for the DEA, with the explanation that coyotes are not involved in drug trafficking. Yet 
these data are also not available on a sector-specific level.  
I instrument for the flow of migration between the United States and Mexico using the annual 
changes to a differential of sector-weighted averages of the unemployment rates in Mexico and the 
United States. This follows Bohn and Pugatch’s (2013) finding that crossing location partially determines 
where the migrant chooses to go. Essentially, I construct weighted averages, or indices, of the 
unemployment rates for the destination city and origin Mexican state for each migrant trip. Then I 
subtract the Mexican average from the United States and calculate the annual change in this differential. 
Unemployment rates are provided by the United States Bureau of Labor Services (BLS) and the Encuesta 
Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE). BLS data are provided by city from 1995 to 2011, while the 
ENOE data are state-specific from 1995 to 2004 and by major city from 2005 to 2011. Table 4 reveals 
that the U.S. unemployment rates exceed that of Mexico for each sector. I do not expect this 
relationship and it is likely due to the poor specification of Mexican unemployment, which neglects 
agricultural unemployment.  
This instrumental variable follows the identification strategy that more migrants will move north 
when there are more opportunities for employment in the United States. In the data, movement occurs 
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when the difference between U.S. and Mexican unemployment falls. As more migrants head north, the 
CBP will respond by increasing the number of agents along the border. Therefore, I expect a negative 
relationship between this instrumental variable and agents per mile. While this instrumental variable is 
exogenous, the increase in migration flows from unemployment may not pass the exclusion restriction. 
If unemployment rates increase traffic along the border, this could also increase the demand for coyote 
services. 
Table 7 shows my first stage results for the first two of my instrumental variable regressions and 
several tests of instrument quality. These results reveal that the annual change in the differential has a 
statistically insignificant relationship with agents per mile. Several tests reject the legitimacy of these 
instruments. The Angrist-Pischke F-stat confirms that the instrument is insignificant, and the Cragg-
Donald and Kleibergen-Paap Wald tests show that it is a weak instrument. Likewise, the Kleibergen-Paap 
Chi-squared statistic indicates that the regression is underidentified. Additionally, the Anderson-Rubin 
Wald and Stock-Wright tests show that the instrument is not orthogonal at the 10 percent level. Given 
these results, I choose to ignore the instrumented results in Table 8. 
b. Results 
I present the results from my guiding equation (14) for individual crossing trips regressed by 
sector, cohort and trip-specific data in Table 8. The odd-numbered regressions are ordinary least 
squares and the even-numbered regressions use an instrumental variable. None of the instrumented 
regressions show statistical significance on agents per mile at the five percent level. I exclude the 
instrumental variable from subsequent specifications. Regressions (1) and (2) do not include operations, 
(3) and (4) include a binary dummy variable for U.S. border operations, and (5) and (6) show these 
operation dummies interacted with their relevant explanatory variable. Prison-specific operations are 
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omitted for collinearity. Regressions (7) – (10) show the same regressions, but the dummy variables are 
equal to the total number of operations by sector. 
In Table 8, the agents per mile are statistically insignificant as a determinant of coyote fees in 
nearly every regression. Agents per mile are statistically significant and positive in regression (3) while 
the migrant operation dummy variable is statistically significant and negative. When interacted with 
agents per mile in regression (5), having a migrant-specific operation decreases the effect of agents per 
mile on the coyote fee at a statistically significant level. These unusual results are likely because migrant 
operations often involved increases to the number of agents, so the two parameters double count the 
effect of border enforcement.  
In regression (7), each additional coyote operation increased coyote fees at the five percent 
significance level. I expect this is because there were fewer coyote operations in most sectors and they 
rarely involved increases to the number of agents. Therefore, these are not coupled with border 
enforcement. This implies that coyote operations were effective at shifting the supply of coyote services 
within the market. These operations may also have increased demand among migrants, but further 
qualitative information is needed to explore that claim. 
Instead, average prison time and wage differential are statistically significant determinants of 
coyote costs across all specifications.  In the OLS regressions, one more month of average prison time 
boosts coyote costs by $25 on average, while a one-dollar increase to the wage differential adds $0.50. 
Additionally, the existence of prison operations boost the average coyote cost, though the interaction 
term with prison time is insignificant. This reveals that coyotes increased their fees to account for their 
increased opportunity cost. 
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Education exhibits significant negative relationships, following the theoretical notion of a 
crossing-specific skill parameter, θ. Migration experience is largely insignificant, which implies that 
migrants do not accumulate crossing-specific human capital through the years. If education determines 
θ, then Gathmann’s (2008) assumption that crossing-specific skill determines wages in the United States 
may not be unfounded. 
Table 9 excludes migrant-specific operations under the assumption that agents are always 
aiming to catch migrants. The agents per mile do not gain statistical significance with this new 
specification, but coyote operations do keep significance. In regression (3), the equivalent of regression 
(5) in Table 8, coyote operations increase coyote fees by $257.7 at a statistically significant level. Neither 
the binary dummy variable nor interaction terms for coyote operations are statistically significant in this 
regression. It appears the effect on the market compounds with each additional coyote operation. 
Otherwise, the results in Table 9 are very similar to those in Table 8. 
These main results show that excluding coyote operations, U.S. border operations and agents 
per mile are not statistically significant determinants of coyote fees. The significance of coyote 
operations requires further qualitative research to inform this quantitative analysis. The null result for 
the other enforcement parameters implies that the U.S. enforcement policies have a null effect on the 
human smuggling market and undocumented migration flows. Instead, the U.S. threat of increasing the 
penalty for an immigration offense leads coyotes to increase their fees. It is unclear how or whether this 
changes the overall migration flow, as increased coyote fees may just price migrants out instead of 
discouraging migration.  
c. Robustness Checks 
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I test the robustness of the above findings through several new specifications. First, I exclude 
cases following 2005 to see whether the shift in prosecution policy after Operation Streamline affects 
the significance of the prison term. Next, I use the sector averages of coyote fees in my guiding equation 
excluding the vector for individual trip characteristics. After that, I use the hours per mile extrapolated 
from the data for agents as a second specification for enforcement. Then, I lag agents per mile one and 
two years to account for budgetary delays to U.S. border policy. Following that, I replace agents with a 
calculated measure of the annual probability of apprehension for each sector, to check the validity of 
the overarching theory. Last, I use fixed, random and between effects with the imperfect panel of 
sector-specific coyote fees. 
Tables 10 and 11 exclude the all years after 2005 from my regression, removing the effects of 
the operations that led to the direct prosecution of any apprehended migrant outside of California. 
These regressions follow the same ordering as Tables 10 and 11 and show that average prison time is 
robust as a determinant of coyote prices. In this regression, the prison, wage differential, and education 
terms stay statistically significant in most regressions. Table 11 indicates statistical significance for 
agents per mile in OLS regressions (2) and (4), which I interpret as enforcement having some effect on 
coyote fees prior to 2005, which is consistent with Gathmann (2008). Regression (1) is the closest to 
Gathmann’s (2008) analysis, but my results do not show statistical significance. These results further 
weaken the relationship found in Gathmann (2008) unless further parameters are added to the analysis. 
Tables 12 and 13 regress sector averages of coyote fees against sector-wide average variables, 
excluding the trip-specific variables.16 Since the number of trips varies by year and sector from one to 
more than 100, these averages are less than completely reliable. Additionally, observations fall to 112 
                                                          
16 
I also have results for these two tables excluding years after 2005, but these are not included to save space. These results 
maintain the findings reported in Tables 10 and 11 and are available upon request. 
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due to low reporting in sectors like Big Bend. Table 13 excludes migrant operations. The insignificance of 
agents per mile proves robust to this specification, but the significance average prison time may not. 
Average prison time is significant in regressions (2), (3) and (5) of Table 12 and (4) of Table 13. Rather 
then question robustness, I argue that the lack of observations severely limits the power of the 
significance tests and I can ignore the lack of complete consistency.  
Tables 14 and 15 report the results using an estimate of the linewatch hours per mile, which 
confirm the insignificance of enforcement. In these specifications, hours per mile offers very similar 
output to the agents per mile. Additionally, the average prison time, wage differential, education and 
experience terms are significant across nearly every specification.   
Following this specification, I lag the agents per mile one and two years to see whether the two-
year delay between CBP planning and actual staffing changes (Bohn and Pugatch 2013) alters statistical 
significance. Tables 16 and 17 show agents lagged one and two periods for individual coyote fees. 
These results show that agents per mile have statistically significant relationship with coyotes, 
confirming Bohn and Pugatch (2013). When agents are lagged one or two years, the coyote fee 
increased $7-$8 and $10-$12, respectively. The significance of lagging implies that coyotes and migrants 
decide to supply and demand services based on recent years’ instead of contemporaneous 
enforcement. Policymakers should expect a delay between the change in border security and analyzable 
output. These regressions do prove the robustness that the average prison term is significant, while 
borders operations remain negligible.   
Migrants likely use information from past years to determine the likelihood of apprehension. To 
account for that, I calculate the probability of apprehension using the MMP dataset. I append the 
mig143 and migother143 dataset, to maximize survey reports. I calculated the annual sector probability 
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of apprehension using migrant-reported deportations for each crossing.  
Table 18 shows that the probability of apprehension is a statistically and economically significant 
determinant of coyote fees. With 100 percent probability of apprehension coyote fees increase by 
$5,500 for each individual trip. Migrants perceive the probability of apprehension and will demand 
coyote services accordingly. This result shows that current enforcement does not appear to affect 
migrants’ perceptions. 
Finally, I report the results of sector fixed effects, annual random effects and annual-sector 
between effects regressions in Tables 19-21, respectively. These panels are strongly balanced, but not 
complete, so the effects are not perfect. My results prove robust to random and between effects, 
however; fixed effects add significance to agents per mile, the coyote operation dummy variable and 
interaction term. In regressions (1)-(4), agents per mile significantly increase average coyote prices, but 
when an operation targeting a coyote is in effect, this effect drops about $800.  
This shows that my initial regression does not account for sector-specific qualities that alter the 
costs and supply of smuggling for coyotes. For example, Yuma is largely filled with the Sonora Desert, 
meaning that there are fewer crossing areas. As a result, additional agents can create choke points more 
easily and boost the price of coyote fees. 
Likewise, average prison time and the wage differential lose their significance in a few 
regressions. I expect that average prison time lost significance because of this is a fixed effects model for 
nine sectors, but it is representative of five regions that include all nine sectors. Therefore, several 
sectors have the same average prison time and would lose some significance in a fixed effects model. 
Additionally, it appears that certain sectors lead migrants to better wage differentials. If crossing 
location determines location choice as Bohn and Pugatch (2013) show, then migrants crossing in the 
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same sector are likely experience similar wage differentials. In example, those crossing in San Diego are 
more likely to find greater wage differentials than those in Big Bend. Therefore, the fixed effects model 
might be capturing this variation in wage differentials. Yet, the panel is not balanced, so I do not 
discount my results. 
Table 22 is a robustness check for neighboring enforcement measured in the average of agents 
per mile in the two neighboring sectors. This variable measures the average of agents per mile in San 
Diego and Yuma, for the middle sector El Centro. For sectors that border an ocean, San Diego and Rio 
Grande, only the one neighboring sector’s agents per mile are included. 
This specification shows the somewhat unexpected result that neighboring enforcement is both 
significant and highly positive in determining coyote fees in a sector. Essentially, it appears that migrants 
consider enforcement in neighboring sectors when choosing a crossing location along the border. The 
parameter estimates show that as the average across these sectors increases by one agent, the coyote 
price increases by about $50. Adding this variable does not notably alter the significance of the other 
parameters, but it implies that U.S. enforcement may act as a determinant of migrant location choice. 
The robustness of my results furthers the finding that enforcement does not affect coyote fees, 
weakening the minimal relationship in Gathmann (2008). Fixed effects alter this result substantially, but 
with an imperfect panel, so I maintain that agents do not significantly alter coyote fees. 
VI. Conclusion 
This study set out to test whether U.S. enforcement policies create demand-dominant or supply-
dominant shifts in the coyote market. My findings show a near null relationship between enforcement 
and coyote prices, differing from a literature that finds a weak relationship. This lack of significance is 
notable because of the correlation and straightforward theoretical relationship between enforcement 
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and prices. Additionally, my results prove robust to all specifications, except for a sector fixed effects 
model. Since this panel is not perfectly balanced, this is likely the result of a poor specification more 
than an improvement on the model. Instead, my results show that enforcement may affect where a 
migrant chooses to cross, in support of Bohn and Pugatch’s (2013) location-based argument. 
Enforcement influences where migrants crossing, but do not appear to affect the choice to hire a 
coyote. 
 This paper does not disprove the market theory of coyote services. Instead, it shows that 
current U.S. policy may not affect market dynamics for coyote services.  
 My analysis also confirmed that as the crossing-skill parameter, θ, increases coyote prices fall. 
Oddly, years of education instead of past migration experience measured in trips appears to determine 
this parameter. This relationship implies that the migrants in this study did not accumulate crossing-
specific human capital during past crossings. The connection between education and this parameter 
supports Gathmann’s (2008) claim that crossing skill is a determinant of a migrant’s wage differential, 
which I removed from my simplified model. 
 The relationship between average prison time and coyote fees directly supports the market 
hypothesis. The fact that this relationship is upheld before 2005 confirms that prison shifts the supply of 
coyote services inward. After 2005 imprisoning migrants may have led more migrants to demand coyote 
services, but parsing this out is beyond the scope of this paper. Future studies should confirm this 
finding once the MMP gathers more responses on trips after 2005. These studies will prove critical in 
evaluating the Streamline operations. 
 Additionally, other studies should explore economies of scale and returns to scale for the supply 
of coyote services, given the statistical significance on whether or not a coyote smuggle a single migrant 
32 
 
 
32 
or many. This would require a significant amount of coyote-specific data, but the significance of the 
Crossed Alone variable indicate that it is a relevant market dynamic. Also, further studies should 
consider the transactions between migrants and coyotes. Economic models like the one in this paper 
could benefit from the findings of ethnographic studies in these areas.  
 I also encourage future studies on this topic with access to more data to explore whether the 
overall effect of enforcement changed after the anti-immigrant policies of the early 1990s. This is 
beyond the access to data in this study, but it is a critical part of future studies.  
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1 
Tables 
Table 1: Border Operations Since the 1980s 
Program Start  End  Sector/State Description Category 
Operation Disruption 1 1985 1985 
California, 
Arizona 
Apprehended 7,200 
immigrants and 232 
smugglers in 30-day "crack 
down" 
Migrant 
& Coyote 
Immigration Reform & 
Control Act (IRCA) 1986 2013 Whole Border 
Established penalties for firms 
that hire undocumented 
migrants in U.S. Migrant 
Operation Hold The Line 
(HTL) 1993 2005 El Paso 
Place agents along the border 
to "catch and release" 
undocumented migrants Migrant 
Operation Gatekeeper 1994 2005 San Diego 
Place agents along the border 
to "catch and release" 
undocumented migrants Migrant 
Automated Biometric 
Identification 1995 2013 San Diego 
A fingerprint and 
photography-based 
tracking system to catch 
criminal migrants and 
repeat offenders Prison 
Operation Disruption 2 1995 2013 San Diego 
Aimed to capture coyotes 
along the border Coyote 
Operation Safeguard 1995 2005 Tucson 
Place agents along the border 
to "catch and release" 
undocumented migrants Migrant 
Automated Biometric 
Identification  1996 2013 Whole Border IDENT expanded everywhere Prison 
January 1996 Spring 
Plan 1996 1997 San Diego 
Added 200 agents to address 
high numbers of migrants 
Migrant 
& Coyote 
Operation Rio Grande  1997 2013 Texas 
Deployed more agents and 
high-tech equipment to 
track migrants Migrant 
Border Safety Initiative 1998 2013 Whole Border 
Tell migrants of the dangers of 
illegal migration by sending 
PSAs around Mexican 
border communities, 
established search and 
rescue teams Migrant 
Department of 
Homeland Security 2003 2013 Whole Border 
This new department followed 
9/11 and treated border 
security as a matter of 
homeland security 
Migrant 
& 
Coyotes 
Operation Desert 
Safeguard 2003 2013 Arizona 
Reduce deaths by increasing 
emergency response staff Migrant 
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along the border 
Operation ICE Storm 2003 2008 Arizona 
Immigration Control & 
Enforcement joined to 
counter human smuggling Coyote 
Arizona Border Control 
Initiative (ABC) 2004 2008 Arizona 
Added agents and tripwires 
along border Coyote 
Operation Against 
Smugglers (and 
Traffickers) 
Initiative on Safety 
and Security 
(OASISS) 2005 2013 
Central, El 
Paso, Eagle 
Pass Texas 
Mexico and U.S. police officers 
and agents work together 
to stop smugglers by 
sharing information for 
prosecution Coyote 
Operation Streamline 2005 2013 Del Rio, Texas 
Criminal prosecution for 
unauthorized crossings, 
harsher sentences for 
repeat offenders. Area of 
effect: 210 miles around 
Del Rio Prison 
Operation Streamline 2007 2013 
Rio Grande, 
Texas 
Spread to Rio Grande Valley. 
Area of effect: Not 
reported Prison 
Operation Streamline 2008 2013 Laredo, Texas 
Spread to Laredo. Area of 
effect: 171 miles around Prison 
Operation No Pass 2005 2013 El Paso, Texas 
El Paso's equivalent of 
Streamline, area of effect 
not given Prison 
Smuggling interdiction 
Group (SIG) 2005 2013 San Diego 
United several special-purpose 
enforcement units to catch 
smugglers Coyote 
Secure Border Initiative 2005 2013 Whole Border 
A bill passed to improve the 
fencing along the border. 
There are 600 miles to 
date. Migrant 
Operation Rio Grande 
Texas (RGT) 2006 2008 Texas Pure assistance basis 
Migrant 
& Coyote 
Operation Jump Start 2006 2008 Whole Border 
National Guard observed and 
reported Coyote 
Illegal Immigration 
Prevention and 
Apprehension Co-
op (IIMPACT) 2007 2013 Arizona 
Attempted to dismantle 
criminal organizations that 
support undocumented 
migration along the border Coyote 
Operation Lifeguard 2007 2010 El Paso, Texas 
Aimed at stopping smugglers 
that work along canals, 
part of OASISS Coyote 
Operation Border Star  2007 2010 Texas Border surge operations of Migrant 
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local, state and federal 
agents 
Texas Hold 'Em 2008 2011 Texas 
Took away the Commercial 
Drivers' License of Whole 
Border tractor trailer 
drivers that smuggle 
migrants Coyote 
Operation Arizona 
Denial 2008 2013 Arizona 
Equivalent of Operation 
Streamline in Arizona. 
Targets those with 
previous criminal records 
and gives them jail time. 
Area of effect: 120 miles 
around Yuma and 15 miles 
around Tucson Migrant 
Operation En Fuego 2008 2008 Arizona 
7-month operation that 
targeted a smuggling ring Coyote 
Operation River Walker 2008 2008 Tucson 
Caught migrants and coyotes 
sneaking along the San 
Pedro River 
Migrant 
& Coyote 
Alien Transfer Exit 
Program 2008 2013 
San Diego, 
Yuma, El 
Centro 
This program deported male 
migrants without families 
to another part of the 
border away from their 
coyote to disrupt the 
market Migrant 
Alien Transfer Exit 
Program 2009 2013 
Tucson and El 
Paso 
Expansion to Tucson and El 
Paso Migrant 
Operation In Plain Sight 2010 2010 
Tucson and 
Phoenix, 
Arizona 
ICE sent 800 agents to Arizona, 
caught 54 suspects Coyote 
Mexico interior 
Repatriation 
Program 2010 2013 Yuma 
Deport unauthorized migrants 
back to their home 
communities Migrant 
Alliance to Combat 
Transnational 
Threats 2010 2013 
New 
Mexico/West 
Texas 
This increased collaboration 
between border 
enforcement groups on 
either side of the border Migrant 
Arizona Border 
Surveillance 
Technology Plan 2012 2013 Arizona 
This was an attempt to 
improve border 
enforcement by creating a 
video surveillance system 
with a live feed in regional 
offices. 
Migrant 
& Coyote 
Source: U.S. Customs & Border Protection, U.S. Department of Justice, Congressional Research Service, National Immigration Forum, 
Migration Policy Institute 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sex 192532 0.0465 0.211 0 1 
Age 13911 29.600 10.017 1 83 
Education 192257 5.387 3.996 0 28 
U.S. Trips 192332 3.537 4.747 1 44 
Crossed Alone 193094 0.977 0.149 0 1 
Coyote Use 12973 0.752 0.432 0 1 
# Deportations 12445 0.541 1.565 0 60 
Successful? 14095 0.99 0.098 0 1 
Real Coyote Fee 6538 828.960 754.131 0 17182.130 
Wage Differential 2658 1574.402 802.306 708.106 5890.727 
Prison 890 21.134 4.818 5 33.500 
Total Agents 21 9979.714 5004.65 3444 18447 
Linewatch Hours 70 181104.5 61774.92 75691.5 367606.7 
Note: This presents summary statistics for the Mexican Migration Project. Observations are person-trips for demographic and 
crossing variables. Other variables are by sector-rear. The wage differential is cohort specific. All monetary values are measured in 
2005 real U.S. Dollars. The coyote use variable reports what percent hire a coyote. They Agents variable is available from 1992 to 
2013. Linewatch hours are available from 1960. Prison data are available from 1995 to 2013. 
Table 3: Regression Specific Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Coyote Fee 1054 1486.180 891.882 0 17182.130 
Agents Per Mile 144 8.531 10.349 0.212 44.483 
Hours Per Mile 253 165.723 351.831 0.004 2906.461 
Prison Time 119 21.558 4.820 8.700 33.500 
Wage Differential 1054 1393.195 407.752 912.579 4469.318 
Age 1054 32.155 9.080 15 64 
Sex 1054 0.028 0.164 0 1 
Education (yrs) 1054 6.794 3.251 0 17 
Experience 1054 1.595 2.469 0 20 
Crossed Alone? 1054 0.854 0.353 0 1 
Used Coyote 1052 1 0 1 1 
Average Deportations 992 0.498 1.128 0 15 
Average U.S. Trips 1054 3.057 2.907 1 24 
Origin Community Unemployment Rate Index 1054 2.940 0.894 1.136 6.523 
Destination Unemployment Rate Index 1049 5.609 1.352 3.060 11.700 
Note: This shows regression summary statistics. Observations are in person-trips for demographic and crossing variables. Other 
variables are by sector-year. The wage differential is cohort specific. All monetary values are measured in 2005 real U.S. Dollars. The 
coyote use variable reports what percent hire a coyote. They Agents variable is available from 1992 to 2013. Linewatch hours are 
available from 1960.  Prison data are available from 1995 to 2013.
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Table 4: Sector-specific Summary Statistics 
Variable Big Bend Del Rio El Centro 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Coyote Fee 3 1910.024 1973.816 608.347 4181.102 62 1670.68 832.6281 117.578 4574.565 47 1602.583 675.639 109.613 3353.829 
Agents Per Mile 3 0.263 0.002 0.261 0.265 14 4.057 1.713 1.900 7.857 13 7.772 3.676 2.662 15.211 
Hours Per Mile 3 9.334 1.935 7.937 11.543 14 266.214 112.026 117.385 515.340 13 520.300 228.604 159.297 974.116 
Prison Time 3 19.567 1.405 18.1 20.9 14 24.879 6.0507 14.6 33.5 13 20.469 2.878 15.7 24.9 
Wage Differential 3 1013.587 79.217 922.180 1062.247 62 1448.757 338.816 922.18 2967.183 47 1305.46 240.706 922.1797 1843.203 
Age 3 26.667 4.509 22 31 62 34.419 9.123 16 55 47 31.66 9.246 19 59 
Sex 3 0 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 0 47 0.0213 0.146 0 1 
Education (yrs) 3 5 1.732 3 6 62 7.065 2.56 0 13 47 5.851 2.797 0 12 
Experience 3 0.333 0.577 0 1 62 1.048 1.372 0 7 47 1.447 2.561 0 13 
Crossed Alone? 3 0.667 0.577 0 1 62 0.935 0.248 0 1 47 0.872 0.337 0 1 
Used Coyote 3 1 0 1 1 62 1 0 1 1 47 1 0 1 1 
Average Deportations 3 0 0 0 0 60 0.417 0.869 0 4 45 0.756 1.384 0 6 
Average U.S. Trips 3 1.667 1.155 1 3 62 2.565 1.564 1 8 47 2.66 2.681 1 14 
Origin Unemployment Index 3 3.853 0.586 3.359 4.5 62 2.869 0.944 1.887 6.523 47 2.564 1.11 1.484 5.563 
Destination Unemployment Index 2 4.199 0.282 4 4.398 62 5.891 2.098 3.8 11.659 47 6.285 1.339 4.286 8.515 
Variable El Paso Laredo Rio Grande 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Coyote Fee 80 1273.814 765.133 57.274 3455.084 44 1304.12 585.935 119.46 2476.047 50 1641.72 852.597 121.669 5480.653 
Agents Per Mile 14 5.240 2.377 2.784 10.119 14 5.015 1.943 2.427 9.567 16 4.461 1.798 1.481 7.628 
Hours Per Mile 14 373.473 166.234 213.451 716.578 14 387.843 147.463 174.028 735.891 16 256.031 103.219 83.659 437.419 
Prison Time 14 14.82857 3.24 8.7 21.4 14 22.421 4.996 13.7 30.8 16 22 4.793 13.7 30.8 
Wage Differential 80 1349.351 305.313 912.579 2147.235 44 1413.364 223.151 1037.156 1952.910 50 1357.239 301.204 912.5793 2106.157 
Age 80 31.3375 8.382 17 58 44 38.045 9.435 18 63 50 30.34 7.311 16 49 
Sex 80 0.075 0.265 0 1 44 0.023 0.151 0 1 50 0 0 0 0 
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Education (yrs) 80 6.3875 3.192 1 13 44 5.591 3.301 0 12 50 7.4 2.748 0 12 
Experience 80 1.1375 1.589 0 7 44 2.727 4.014 0 15 50 1.48 1.887 0 7 
Crossed Alone? 80 0.7625 0.428 0 1 44 0.864 0.347 0 1 50 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Used Coyote 80 1 0 1 1 44 1 0 1 1 50 1 0 1 1 
Average Deportations 71 0.859155 2.065 0 15 42 0.452 0.916 0 5 48 0.3125 0.719 0 3 
Average U.S. Trips 80 2.1375 1.636 1 8 44 4.091 4.203 1 16 50 2.86 2.232 1 9 
Origin Unemployment Index 80 2.998057 1.244 1.802 6.253 44 2.89 0.923 1.85 4.335 50 3.287 1.276 1.972 6.116 
Destination Unemployment Index 79 4.781649 1.191 3.762 9.662 42 5.2 1.196 3.7 7.753 49 4.849 1.75 3.06 11.7 
Variable San Diego Tucson Yuma 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Coyote Fee 288 1395.403 1155.764 0 17182.13 446 1520.327 762.243 47.031 8943.543 34 1779.001 618.135 632.778 3691.204 
Agents Per Mile 17 34.303 6.086 23.883 44.483 17 7.816 4.065 1.553 16.179 10 2.856 1.404 1.389 6.143 
Hours Per Mile 17 2276.940 400.687 1698.437 2906.461 17 492.472 251.325 94.512 1010.498 10 236.230 118.771 121.928 512.234 
Prison Time 17 20.541 2.631 15.7 24.9 18 23.372 3.321 17 27.8 34 24.426 1.85 21.2 26.7 
Wage Differential 288 1329.47 351.783 912.579 4250.049 446 1449.173 497.976 912.579 4469.318 34 1382.071 232.345 1060.808 2147.235 
Age 288 31.889 9.327 15 60 446 32.061 9.041 16 64 34 29.647 7.843 18 53 
Sex 288 0.042 0.2 0 1 446 0.018 0.133 0 1 34 0.029 0.171 0 1 
Education (yrs) 288 6.646 3.137 0 17 446 7.123 3.509 0 17 34 6.324 2.495 0 13 
Experience 288 1.42 2.415 0 14 446 1.809 2.614 0 20 34 1.353 1.649 0 6 
Crossed Alone? 288 0.802 0.399 0 1 446 0.895 0.307 0 1 34 0.824 0.387 0 1 
Used Coyote 286 1 0 1 1 446 1 0 1 1 34 1 0 1 1 
Average Deportations 271 0.432 0.952 0 7 420 0.481 0.99 0 8 32 0.656 1.825 0 9 
Average U.S. Trips 288 2.767 2.751 1 16 446 3.487 3.242 1 24 34 2.559 1.673 1 7 
Origin Unemployment Index 288 3.035 0.796 1.846 4.774 446 2.913 0.777 1.998 5.14 34 2.475 0.657 1.136 3.966 
Destination Unemployment Index 288 5.962 1.088 3.868 10 446 5.454 1.154 4.054 10.273 34 6.796 1.761 3.75 9.883 
 Note: This table shows summary statistics by border sector. Observations are in terms of person-trips for demographic and crossing variables. Other variables are measures by sectors that occur each 
crossing year. The family crossing variables measure how many family members had taken a trip before the crossing in question. The wage differential is cohort specific. All monetary values are 
measured in 2005 real U.S. Dollars. The coyote use variable reports what percent hire a coyote. They Agents variable is available from 1992 to 2013. Prison data are available from 1995 to 2013.
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Table 5: Correlations of Agents and Hours Per Mile 
Sector 1992-1998 1992-1997 
Whole Border 0.9897 0.992 
Big Bend 0.8819 0.6804 
Del Rio 0.9629 0.9537 
El Centro 0.9877 0.8581 
El Paso 0.8082 0.7042 
Laredo 0.9022 0.7343 
Rio Grande 0.9925 0.9764 
San Diego 0.9515 0.9467 
Tucson 0.9455 0.9293 
Yuma 0.0022 0.5006 
Note: Correlation of Agents per Mile and Hours per mile in each border sector. The correlations are shown over the full 1992-1999 
and lower 1992-1998 overlap. Yuma is uncharacteristically low. The increase points to 1999 as an anomaly year. 
Table 6: Change in Agents by Change in Migration 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Simultaneous One-year lag Two-year lag 
    
Change in 
undocumented 
migrants 
-0.0560*** 
(0.0162) 
-0.00606 
(0.00834) 
0.0204** 
(0.00821) 
Constant 0.451*** 0.518*** 0.516*** 
 (0.0990) (0.100) (0.0986) 
    
Observations 179 179 179 
R-squared 0.063 0.003 0.034 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Change in agents per mile regressed by the change in amount of migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border by sector from 
1992 to 2013. The first regression uses a simultaneous change in undocumented migrants. The second lags this variable one year. 
Agents per mile are reported by Customs & Border Protection, while the number of undocumented migrants comes is reported by 
the Mexican Migration Project.
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Table 7: First-stage results of instrumental variables 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Agents per mile Agents per mile 
   
Average Prison Term -0.728*** -0.864*** 
 (0.140) (0.145) 
Wage Differential -0.00354** -0.00456*** 
 (0.00166) (0.00164) 
Age 0.117 0.124* 
 (0.0728) (0.0686) 
Sex 1.115 2.926 
 (3.269) (2.856) 
Education (yrs) 0.257 0.209 
 (0.236) (0.227) 
Migration Experience -0.691*** -0.647*** 
 (0.188) (0.182) 
Crossed Alone? -2.720 -1.882 
 (2.214) (2.190) 
Migrant Operation Dummy  10.38*** 
  (0.999) 
Coyote Operation Dummy  14.16*** 
  (1.748) 
U.S.-Mexico Unemployment Differential 4.929 20.15 
 (19.72) (17.54) 
Constant 26.77*** 0.649 
 (5.877) (7.083) 
Angrist-Pischke F-stat 0.06 1.32 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat 0.32 5.71** 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-stat 0.06 1.32 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-stat 2.24* 2.96* 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald chi-quared 0.06 1.22 
Anderson-Rubin Wald Chi-squared 2.27* 2.96* 
Stock-Wright LM S statistic 1.76* 2.99* 
Observations 926 926 
R-squared 0.103 0.205 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This table shows the first stage regression results for the first two IV regressions in Table 8. The excluded instruments are the 
Mexican Unemployment and U.S. Unemployment indices.  I include the Angrist-Pischke F-test for excluded instruments, the Cragg-
Donald Wald and Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistics for weak identification, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald chi-squared value tests for 
underidentification, and the Anderson-Rubin Wald F statistic and Chi-squared statistic, and Stock-Right LM S statistic to test for 
orthogonality.
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Table 8: Individual Trip Coyote Fees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
           
Agents Per Mile 5.731* 235.4 6.820** 67.80 238.4 23,641 -3.324 44.20* -14.42 -4,610 
 (3.064) (1,025) (3.132) (87.03) (146.8) (44,350) (5.193) (25.44) (15.39) (3,936) 
Prison Time 28.77*** 191.7 28.48*** 78.26 -5.798 2,529 23.09*** 27.77*** -24.36 -487.6 
 (8.035) (749.2) (7.883) (75.85) (44.27) (4,677) (8.241) (9.536) (40.74) (387.8) 
Wage Differential 0.563*** 1.466 0.536*** 0.919** 0.506*** 0.232 0.514*** 0.751*** 0.504*** 1.300* 
 (0.165) (3.595) (0.162) (0.432) (0.160) (0.705) (0.168) (0.136) (0.160) (0.719) 
Age -4.299 -33.49 -3.180 -13.79 -2.407 4.351 -3.819 -8.820* -3.558 -14.61 
 (5.244) (119.7) (5.116) (11.97) (5.031) (24.78) (5.220) (4.722) (5.075) (18.20) 
Sex -112.2 -494.9 -104.9 -417.9 -95.68 -1,236 -122.6 -215.2 -117.0 -75.43 
 (173.6) (1,400) (176.2) (366.6) (177.1) (1,313) (172.1) (135.2) (167.0) (728.8) 
Education (yrs) -47.82*** -98.74 -43.05*** -50.85* -40.18*** 6.012 -46.15*** -41.90*** -44.40*** -28.50 
 (13.96) (268.5) (13.12) (25.97) (12.35) (74.83) (13.30) (13.15) (13.57) (33.63) 
Experience -16.22 146.3 -13.46 28.67 -11.00 -14.45 -16.28 -8.099 -17.20* -47.92 
 (10.34) (707.7) (10.34) (59.72) (10.35) (64.42) (10.26) (10.67) (9.802) (48.48) 
Crossed Alone? 189.4** 876.2 189.5** 362.3* 201.0** 250.6 181.1** 253.7*** 176.1** 372.4 
 (83.21) (2,769) (82.20) (216.7) (81.59) (184.4) (81.61) (86.51) (80.54) (238.9) 
Migrant Operation 
Dummy 
  -332.8*** 
(88.73) 
-821.5 
(912.5) 
127.8 
(131.6) 
4,808 
(9,173) 
    
Coyote Operation 
Dummy 
  219.4* 
(117.5) 
-701.5 
(1,160) 
-186.3 
(1,003) 
92,332 
(172,397) 
    
Migrant Operation 
Dummy 
Interaction 
    -82.86*** 
(22.80) 
-770.4 
(1,392) 
    
Coyote Operation 
Dummy 
Interaction 
    -149.4 
(146.1) 
-22,884 
(43,015) 
    
Prison Operations     33.07 -2,529   47.58 423.4 
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Interaction (44.80) (4,725) (40.98) (329.0) 
Prison Operation       210.0* 21.58 -626.1 -4,512 
       (113.1) (140.8) (786.2) (3,469) 
Migrant 
Operations 
      -100.5 
(71.59) 
-176.0** 
(70.40) 
-137.1 
(96.39) 
-17,616 
(14,562) 
Coyote Operations       240.7** -954.2 77.23 -2,154 
       (112.9) (594.5) (155.7) (2,150) 
Migrant Operation 
Interaction 
        -0.328 
(15.71) 
4,448 
(3,715) 
Coyote Operation 
Interaction 
        13.69 
(9.631) 
193.2 
(256.6) 
Constant 297.0* -7,148 340.1* -604.4 303.9 -95,957 380.0* 61.81 1,315* 24,670 
 (179.3) (32,711) (205.0) (1,218) (1,002) (179,510) (213.5) (267.5) (797.5) (19,745) 
           
Observations 1,054 926 1,054 926 1,054 926 1,054 926 1,054 926 
R-squared 0.121  0.136  0.149  0.136 0.019 0.141  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This is a regression of individual crossing coyote fees against sector Agents, Prison, wage differentials and enforcement operations and crossing demographics from 1995 to 2011. The 
instrumental variable is an index of U.S. and Mexican unemployment. (3)-(6) use a dummy variable for operations and (7)-(10) sum total operations. R-squared’s are omitted when negative when IV’s 
give negative model sum of squares.
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Table 9: Individual Trip Coyote Fees Excluding Migrant Operations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS 
     
Agents per mile 5.156 236.8 -3.754 -12.54 
 (3.133) (147.2) (5.172) (9.237) 
Average Prison Term 27.38*** 11.56 25.90*** -14.02 
 (8.097) (43.48) (7.885) (40.58) 
Wage Differential 0.556*** 0.550*** 0.507*** 0.496*** 
 (0.166) (0.166) (0.165) (0.155) 
Age -4.182 -3.909 -3.910 -3.702 
 (5.255) (5.261) (5.214) (5.064) 
Sex -102.8 -111.5 -128.6 -125.9 
 (174.9) (175.7) (171.1) (166.5) 
Education (yrs) -47.75*** -46.46*** -46.53*** -45.19*** 
 (13.99) (14.02) (13.49) (13.62) 
Migration Experience -15.94 -14.93 -16.65 -17.36* 
 (10.44) (10.51) (10.25) (9.841) 
Crossed Alone? 191.8** 189.7** 186.4** 184.2** 
 (83.25) (83.59) (81.50) (80.85) 
Coyote Operation Dummy 169.1 312.5   
 (107.0) (994.1)   
Coyote Operation Dummy Interaction  -231.7   
  (147.5)   
Prison Operations   168.5 -567.9 
   (106.7) (788.5) 
Coyote Operations   257.5** 138.4 
   (111.3) (156.8) 
Prison Operation Interaction  16.33  40.91 
  (43.98)  (41.01) 
Coyote Operations Interaction    10.37 
    (9.388) 
Constant 176.4 15.13 270.1 1,037 
 (191.2) (975.9) (195.1) (785.4) 
     
Observations 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 
R-squared 0.122 0.124 0.134 0.137 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This is a regression of individual crossing coyote fees against sector agents, prison terms, wage differentials, enforcement 
operations that affect coyotes, and migration-specific demographics and details from 1995 to 2011. All regressions are Ordinary 
Least Squares. Regressions (1) and (2) feature a dummy variable for coyotes. (3) and (4) show summations of these operations. 
Prison operations omitted for multicollinearity in regressions (1) and (2).  
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Table 10: Individual Trip Coyote Fees before 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
      
Agents Per Mile 4.535 5.003 227.3 5.857 42.74 
 (3.092) (3.164) (144.4) (5.236) (30.44) 
Prison Time 23.04*** 23.69*** -8.835 19.42** -23.37 
 (7.392) (7.413) (43.02) (7.712) (38.70) 
Wage Differential 0.655*** 0.644*** 0.628*** 0.654*** 0.552*** 
 (0.132) (0.133) (0.132) (0.133) (0.130) 
Age -6.533 -6.150 -5.669 -6.358 -4.241 
 (4.387) (4.383) (4.362) (4.323) (4.088) 
Sex -250.1* -251.9* -261.3* -240.0 -256.8* 
 (150.3) (152.0) (152.7) (150.5) (151.0) 
Education (yrs) -40.14*** -38.71*** -36.95*** -39.88*** -34.91*** 
 (11.65) (11.80) (11.70) (11.71) (11.48) 
Experience -13.47 -12.42 -10.75 -13.44 -14.45 
 (9.755) (9.849) (9.906) (9.825) (10.27) 
Crossed Alone? 258.5*** 253.6*** 249.3*** 245.2*** 244.0*** 
 (80.14) (80.20) (80.69) (80.52) (79.06) 
Migrant Operation Dummy  -171.5** -23.03   
  (81.56) (139.2)   
Coyote Operation Dummy  133.4 -175.8   
  (108.2) (979.4)   
Migrant Operation Dummy Interaction   -40.41   
   (30.40)   
Coyote Operation Dummy Interaction   -181.9   
   (143.6)   
Prison Interaction Term   33.98  34.04 
   (43.44)  (38.98) 
Prison Operation    166.1 -632.3 
    (109.1) (746.1) 
Migration Operations    -141.0** -399.2** 
    (58.51) (177.1) 
Coyote Operations    -64.96 478.2** 
    (129.4) (212.9) 
Migration Operation Interaction     69.98 
     (43.00) 
Coyote Operation Interaction     -110.8*** 
     (33.84) 
Constant 229.9 234.6 357.3 301.6 1,144 
 (174.6) (191.6) (978.7) (201.9) (764.6) 
      
Observations 928 928 928 928 928 
R-squared 0.103 0.107 0.111 0.108 0.122 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This is a regression of individual crossing coyote fees against sector Agents, Prison, wage differentials and enforcement 
operations and crossing demographics from 1995 to 2005. All regressions are Ordinary Least Squares. Regressions (1) and (2) feature 
a dummy variable for coyotes. (3) and (4) show summations of these operations. Prison operations omitted for multicollinearity in 
regressions (1) and (2).
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Table 11: Individual Trip Coyote Fees before 2005 excluding migrant operations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS 
     
Agents Per Mile 4.111 281.2** 5.387 88.40*** 
 (3.153) (131.7) (5.293) (24.29) 
Prison Time 22.11*** 22.46*** 22.15*** -9.624 
 (7.482) (7.483) (7.496) (38.67) 
Wage Differential 0.645*** 0.638*** 0.647*** 0.560*** 
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.132) (0.130) 
Age -6.331 -6.031 -6.372 -4.572 
 (4.391) (4.373) (4.369) (4.170) 
Sex -242.1 -255.1* -240.0 -255.6* 
 (152.7) (152.4) (150.5) (151.9) 
Education (yrs) -39.93*** -38.65*** -39.88*** -36.14*** 
 (11.71) (11.64) (11.70) (11.40) 
Experience -13.36 -12.61 -13.42 -13.81 
 (9.855) (9.860) (9.848) (10.19) 
Crossed Alone? 259.5*** 256.6*** 259.1*** 254.2*** 
 (80.23) (80.61) (80.29) (79.48) 
Coyote Operation Dummy 109.1 648.2***   
 (104.6) (251.1)   
Prison Operations   109.3 -531.8 
   (104.5) (753.2) 
Coyote Dummy Interaction  -277.1**   
  (132.0)   
Prison Interaction    25.78 
    (39.30) 
Coyote Operations   -40.06 412.5** 
   (131.1) (195.6) 
Coyote Interaction    -86.95*** 
    (25.94) 
Constant 156.0 -394.4 151.8 614.0 
 (187.5) (282.5) (189.0) (752.6) 
     
Observations 928 928 928 928 
R-squared 0.104 0.106 0.104 0.117 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This is a regression of individual crossing coyote fees against sector Agents, Prison, wage differentials and enforcement 
operations that affect coyotes and crossing demographics from 1995 to 2005. All regressions are Ordinary Least Squares. 
Regressions (1) and (2) feature a dummy variable for coyotes. (3) and (4) show summations of these operations. Prison operations 
omitted for multicollinearity in regressions (1) and (2).   
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Table 12: Average Sector Coyote Fees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
      
Agents Per Mile 4.146 8.494 399.0 3.153 -14.65 
 (5.778) (5.879) (268.1) (8.677) (22.43) 
Prison Time 19.13 27.40** 77.40*** 17.64 73.64*** 
 (11.93) (12.76) (26.04) (12.93) (27.03) 
Wage Differential 0.377*** 0.321** 0.408*** 0.302** 0.397** 
 (0.130) (0.142) (0.145) (0.145) (0.156) 
Migrant Operation Dummy  -368.9*** -179.8   
  (131.7) (206.8)   
Coyote Operation Dummy  -22.25 811.4   
  (287.0) (600.4)   
Prison Operations  233.8* 858.9*** 205.2 1,029*** 
  (136.1) (315.4) (141.4) (358.4) 
Migrant Operation Dummy Interaction   -34.36   
   (27.55)   
Coyote Operation Dummy Interaction   -358.5   
   (270.0)   
Prison Operations Interaction   -46.49**  -49.45** 
   (21.14)  (21.68) 
Migrant Operation    -163.2 -180.6 
    (98.98) (132.2) 
Coyote Operation    78.62 -32.10 
    (140.9) (225.7) 
Migrant Operation Interaction     -9.710 
     (16.28) 
Coyote Operation Interaction     13.85 
     (15.81) 
Constant 690.0** 580.4* -1,233 660.3* -278.1 
 (324.9) (347.5) (801.9) (344.9) (586.1) 
      
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 
R-squared 0.115 0.192 0.248 0.158 0.209 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This is a regression of average sector coyote fees against sector Agents, Prison, wage differentials and enforcement operations 
from 1995 to 2011. The instrumental variable is an index of U.S. and Mexican unemployment. All regressions are Ordinary Least 
Squares. Regressions (1) and (2) feature a dummy variable for coyotes. (3) and (4) show summations of these operations. Prison 
operations omitted for multicollinearity in regressions (1) and (2).  
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Table 13: Average Sector Coyote Fees excluding Migrant Operations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS 
     
Agents Per Mile 5.466 319.7 0.128 -1.666 
 (5.963) (281.0) (8.549) (21.67) 
Prison Time 25.06* 25.60* 20.94 67.82** 
 (13.14) (13.13) (12.87) (26.94) 
Wage Differential 0.281* 0.280* 0.277* 0.350** 
 (0.146) (0.146) (0.145) (0.153) 
Coyote Operation Dummy -83.29 502.6   
 (295.3) (601.1)   
Prison Operation 186.3 188.6 116.8 712.2** 
 (139.4) (139.2) (131.9) (324.6) 
Coyote Operation Dummy Interaction  -314.3   
  (281.0)   
Prison Operations Interaction    -41.50* 
    (21.41) 
Coyote Operation   111.2 158.3 
   (140.6) (187.1) 
Coyote Operation Interaction    -0.152 
    (10.09) 
Constant 569.7 -28.20 568.5 -292.8 
 (358.5) (643.4) (343.1) (583.8) 
     
Observations 112 112 112 112 
R-squared 0.131 0.142 0.136 0.168 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This is a regression of average sector coyote fees against sector Agents, Prison, wage differentials and enforcement operations 
that target coyotes from 1995 to 2011. All regressions are Ordinary Least Squares. Regressions (1) and (2) feature a dummy variable 
for coyotes. (3) and (4) show summations of these operations. Prison operations omitted for multicollinearity in (1) and (2). 
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Table 14: Individual Coyote Fees by Hours Per Mile excluding Migrant Operations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS 
     
Hours Per Mile -0.00749 -0.328 0.430*** 0.0665 
 (0.0355) (0.301) (0.121) (0.257) 
Prison Time 19.58* 22.34** 27.82** -31.45 
 (11.06) (11.26) (10.93) (39.77) 
Wage Differential 0.433* 0.471* 0.175 0.208 
 (0.249) (0.258) (0.210) (0.219) 
Age -6.411 -6.860 -1.101 -0.920 
 (6.312) (6.472) (5.837) (5.815) 
Sex -257.8* -241.2 -242.5** -209.5* 
 (155.4) (151.0) (113.4) (109.3) 
Education (yrs) -26.16** -29.73** -13.83 -14.33 
 (13.24) (13.61) (13.36) (12.83) 
Experience 14.97 13.59 14.29 15.35* 
 (9.197) (9.179) (9.056) (8.947) 
Crossed Alone? 224.0*** 210.9*** 207.5** 194.9** 
 (79.15) (78.95) (84.36) (82.84) 
Coyote Operation Dummy -18.25 -57.06   
 (108.9) (114.9)   
Prison Operations   -20.41 -1,277 
   (109.5) (792.8) 
Coyote Operation Dummy Interaction  22.29   
  (21.18)   
Prison Operations Interaction    68.93* 
    (41.29) 
Coyote Operation   -964.6*** -1,119*** 
   (265.7) (258.1) 
Coyote Operation Interaction    27.11 
    (17.55) 
Constant 355.1 348.4 212.3 1,336* 
 (305.0) (309.4) (300.8) (789.7) 
     
Observations 444 444 444 444 
R-squared 0.079 0.084 0.121 0.137 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This table shows fees of individual crossings against a simulated measure of hours per mile for the years following 1999, 
excluding Yuma. Prison is time period specific, while wage differential (2005 Real USD) is cohort-specific. Other variables are crossing 
and demographic specific. Only operations that affect coyotes directly are included.
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Table 15: Average Sector Coyote by Hours per Mile excluding Migrant Operations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS 
     
Hours Per Mile 0.0435 3.489 -0.115 0.0572 
 (0.0945) (3.816) (0.145) (0.362) 
Prison Time 15.63 16.35 14.87 58.61 
 (13.06) (13.09) (12.71) (41.17) 
Wage Differential 0.424** 0.423** 0.393** 0.422** 
 (0.161) (0.162) (0.155) (0.164) 
Coyote Operation Dummy 255.0 670.3   
 (360.6) (584.6)   
Prison Operation -138.5 -136.3 -202.7 495.0 
 (242.7) (242.9) (209.6) (749.0) 
Coyote Operation Dummy Interaction  -3.447   
  (3.816)   
Prison Operations Interaction    -40.03 
    (35.51) 
Coyote Operation   259.5 329.9 
   (166.8) (246.6) 
Coyote Operations Interaction    -0.0868 
    (0.180) 
Constant 596.6 165.0 735.5** -180.4 
 (377.7) (609.2) (347.5) (839.2) 
     
Observations 103 103 103 103 
R-squared 0.120 0.128 0.137 0.151 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This table shows average sector coyote fees regressed with hours per mile as a measure of enforcement. All other variables 
are the same as in other regressions of sector level average prices. This regression excludes non-coyote specific polices. Unreported 
hours are calculated using the Agents per mile and correlation value for overlapping years. Sector Yuma is excluded due to poor 
correlation between hours and agents. 
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Table 16: Individual Coyote Fees Regressed by Agents per Mile Lagged One Period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
      
Lagged Agents Per Mile 7.664** 8.966*** 218.2 1.227 -11.33 
 (3.336) (3.423) (165.6) (5.608) (16.21) 
Prison Time 30.34*** 30.37*** -14.03 24.88*** -24.52 
 (8.096) (7.955) (44.15) (8.395) (40.69) 
Wage Differential 0.558*** 0.531*** 0.501*** 0.529*** 0.516*** 
 (0.163) (0.159) (0.157) (0.166) (0.160) 
Age -4.422 -3.288 -2.608 -3.972 -3.748 
 (5.203) (5.068) (4.974) (5.174) (5.071) 
Sex -114.7 -108.9 -87.02 -118.3 -115.3 
 (173.6) (176.2) (176.3) (173.6) (167.2) 
Education (yrs) -47.72*** -42.72*** -39.77*** -46.60*** -44.98*** 
 (13.94) (13.06) (12.26) (13.38) (13.75) 
Experience -15.37 -12.53 -10.19 -15.21 -16.41* 
 (10.25) (10.24) (10.23) (10.20) (9.717) 
Crossed Alone? 192.8** 192.3** 206.1** 185.9** 180.1** 
 (82.84) (81.79) (80.97) (82.06) (80.69) 
Migrant Operation Dummy  -347.6*** 103.8   
  (88.40) (129.3)   
Coyote Operation Dummy  197.0* -507.7   
  (118.5) (980.3)   
Lagged Migrant Operation Dummy Interaction   -93.52***   
   (25.44)   
Lagged Coyote Dummy Interaction   -116.2   
   (162.9)   
Prison Operations*Term   43.27  49.92 
   (44.62)  (40.95) 
Migrant Operation    -107.4 -139.5 
    (72.52) (94.40) 
Coyote Operation    163.9 -17.13 
    (112.5) (156.3) 
Prison Operation    185.7 -690.4 
    (113.6) (785.9) 
Lagged Migration Operations Interaction     -1.460 
     (16.89) 
Lagged Coyote Dummy Interaction     16.73 
     (10.22) 
Constant 249.7 317.9 585.4 327.4 1,301 
 (179.5) (205.1) (988.9) (214.5) (795.6) 
      
Observations 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 
R-squared 0.125 0.141 0.155 0.135 0.142 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This table shows the coyote fees for individual crossings regressed against the staffing per mile lagged one 
period.  All other variables reflect other regressions in paper.  
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Table 17: Individual Coyote Fees Regressed by Agents per Mile Lagged Two Periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
      
Twice Lagged Agents Per Mile 10.88*** 12.41*** 188.3 8.165 -7.632 
 (3.535) (3.627) (161.7) (6.059) (16.29) 
Prison Time 32.97*** 33.38*** -24.50 28.20*** -24.69 
 (8.172) (8.037) (42.32) (8.609) (40.54) 
Wage Differential 0.546*** 0.518*** 0.487*** 0.539*** 0.522*** 
 (0.159) (0.155) (0.153) (0.163) (0.156) 
Age -4.544 -3.376 -2.654 -4.254 -4.037 
 (5.136) (4.987) (4.888) (5.111) (4.988) 
Sex -115.9 -111.7 -87.84 -111.3 -112.5 
 (170.0) (172.0) (172.4) (171.9) (162.7) 
Education (yrs) -47.47*** -42.13*** -38.85*** -46.80*** -45.40*** 
 (13.90) (12.98) (12.15) (13.51) (13.86) 
Experience -14.25 -11.37 -8.731 -13.78 -15.88 
 (10.16) (10.13) (10.11) (10.20) (9.653) 
Crossed Alone? 195.2** 193.6** 209.1*** 190.2** 180.8** 
 (81.10) (79.85) (79.07) (81.37) (79.33) 
Migrant Operation Dummy  -367.6*** 64.57   
  (88.00) (123.1)   
Coyote Operation Dummy  168.8 -841.5   
  (119.5) (929.8)   
Twice Lagged Migrant Operation Dummy 
Interaction 
  -101.6*** 
(27.80) 
  
 
Twice Lagged Coyote Operation Dummy 
Interaction 
  -74.79 
(159.6) 
  
Prison Operations Interaction   56.76  52.95 
   (42.80)  (40.80) 
Migrant Operation    -114.9 -152.8* 
    (74.14) (89.80) 
Coyote Operation    59.01 -123.7 
    (115.4) (141.4) 
Prison Operations    155.0 -773.2 
    (113.5) (783.6) 
Twice Lagged Migration Operations 
Interaction 
    -0.648 
(16.33) 
Twice Lagged Coyote Operations Interaction     18.75** 
     (8.565) 
Constant 178.2 280.8 867.5 250.7 1,310* 
 (178.5) (205.2) (934.2) (215.5) (791.3) 
      
Observations 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 
R-squared 0.136 0.153 0.167 0.140 0.150 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This table shows the coyote fees for individual crossings regressed against the staffing per mile lagged two 
periods.  All other variables reflect other regressions in paper.  
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Table 18: Individual Coyote Fees with Sector-specific Probability of 
Apprehension 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 
    
Probability of Apprehension 5,293*** 5,419*** 5,418*** 
 (1,161) (1,151) (1,152) 
Prison Time 25.84*** 24.08*** -13.47 
 (7.544) (7.571) (40.82) 
Wage Differential 0.503*** 0.485*** 0.480*** 
 (0.144) (0.143) (0.143) 
Age -3.410 -3.138 -2.945 
 (4.604) (4.575) (4.565) 
Sex -150.3 -135.0 -133.9 
 (157.6) (159.0) (158.8) 
Education (yrs) -40.66*** -40.33*** -39.50*** 
 (11.99) (11.97) (11.96) 
Experience -25.84** -24.92** -24.05** 
 (10.30) (10.39) (10.46) 
Crossed Alone? 178.4** 184.2** 184.5** 
 (77.79) (77.96) (77.99) 
Prison Operation  305.2*** -410.9 
  (107.2) (801.0) 
Prison Operations*Term   38.08 
   (41.39) 
Constant -666.2** -940.4*** -243.2 
 (301.3) (312.1) (825.2) 
    
Observations 1,118 1,118 1,118 
R-squared 0.144 0.149 0.149 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This uses the probability of apprehension calculated as the average number of apprehensions in each sector, in each year 
as a regressor for individual coyote fees. Other variables match other regressions.
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Table 19: Average Sector Coyote Fees with Sector Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
      
Agents Per Mile 54.39** 50.85** 897.4*** 50.62** 0.00416 
 (23.51) (24.18) (304.5) (24.29) (23.43) 
Prison Time 24.71 27.53* 94.87** 22.23 65.92 
 (15.17) (16.39) (39.76) (15.61) (41.94) 
Wage Differential 0.250 0.347* 0.440** 0.287 0.426*** 
 (0.170) (0.179) (0.176) (0.175) (0.161) 
Migrant Operation Dummy  -462.5** -177.8   
  (231.6) (301.5)   
Coyote Operation Dummy  439.9 1,859***   
  (356.5) (689.2)   
Prison Operation  -198.1 1,085 -291.0 803.6 
  (239.5) (693.1) (213.1) (807.2) 
Migrant Operation Dummy Interaction   -73.81*   
   (39.32)   
Coyote Operation Dummy Interaction   -796.3***   
   (301.5)   
Prison Operations*Term   -66.39**  -50.29 
   (33.43)  (37.43) 
Migrant Operation    -158.3 -141.3 
    (183.2) (134.3) 
Coyote Operation    330.4** 252.1 
    (158.2) (243.2) 
Migrant Operation Interaction     2.376 
     (16.59) 
Coyote Operation Interaction     -3.423 
     (16.46) 
Constant 295.7 237.9 -2,723** 339.0 -235.3 
 (395.6) (412.1) (1,050) (400.2) (846.6) 
      
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 
R-squared 0.188 0.227 0.314 0.232 0 
Number of Sector 9 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This table shows regressions for average sector-specific coyote fees using the strongly balanced panel of sectors from 1995-
2011. The regression also includes sector fixed effects to account for unaccounted for variations in each sector. 
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Table 20: Average Sector Coyote Fees with Random Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
      
Agents Per Mile 4.151 5.498 406.3 -5.538 0.00416 
 (5.777) (5.943) (274.3) (8.691) (23.43) 
Prison Time 19.13 17.45 81.61** 11.69 65.92 
 (11.93) (12.11) (38.87) (12.58) (41.94) 
Wage Differential 0.377*** 0.461*** 0.453*** 0.413*** 0.426*** 
 (0.130) (0.153) (0.151) (0.152) (0.161) 
Migrant Operation Dummy  -336.7** -137.2   
  (132.6) (210.1)   
Coyote Operation Dummy  350.1 917.7   
  (338.0) (621.5)   
Prison Operation  -112.5 1,019 -157.4 803.6 
  (228.3) (694.4) (198.8) (807.2) 
Migrant Operation Dummy Interaction   -37.19   
   (28.18)   
Coyote Operation Dummy Interaction   -364.5   
   (276.1)   
Prison Operations*Term   -58.75*  -50.29 
   (33.66)  (37.43) 
Migrant Operation    -97.96 -141.3 
    (93.24) (134.3) 
Coyote Operation    236.7 252.1 
    (146.4) (243.2) 
Migrant Operation Interaction     2.376 
     (16.59) 
Coyote Operation Interaction     -3.423 
     (16.46) 
Constant 690.0** 612.7* -1,387 827.7** -235.3 
 (324.9) (352.8) (984.5) (343.2) (846.6) 
      
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 
Number of Sector 9 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This table shows regressions for average sector-specific coyote fees using the strongly balanced panel of sectors from 1995-
2011. The regression also includes random effects to account for variations across the border over time. 
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Table 21: Average Sector Coyote Fees with Sector Between Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
      
Agents Per Mile 6.022 15.04 -1,527 -5.267 0.00416 
 (4.833) (18.89) (0) (12.59) (23.43) 
Prison Time 13.83 7.845 -244.0 -1.911 65.92 
 (13.07) (19.53) (0) (23.37) (41.94) 
Wage Differential -0.435* -0.771 -2.572 -0.890 0.426*** 
 (0.210) (1.428) (0) (1.012) (0.161) 
Migrant Operation Dummy  -234.4 -178.7   
  (267.8) (0)   
Coyote Operation Dummy  -1,152 -1,282   
  (1,941) (0)   
Migrant Operation Dummy Interaction   -1.751   
   (0)   
Coyote Operation Dummy Interaction   1,551   
   (0)   
Prison Operations Interaction   210.8  -50.29 
   (0)  (37.43) 
Prison Operation  1,404  522.5 803.6 
  (2,898)  (1,415) (807.2) 
Migrant Operation    -46.61 -141.3 
    (127.7) (134.3) 
Coyote Operation    348.4 252.1 
    (257.9) (243.2) 
Migrant Operation Interaction     2.376 
     (16.59) 
Coyote Operation Interaction     -3.423 
     (16.46) 
Constant 2,028*** 2,377* 7,510 2,212** -235.3 
 (358.5) (812.7) (0) (419.3) (846.6) 
      
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 
R-squared 0.481 0.626 1.000 0.752 0 
Number of Sector 9 9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This table shows regressions for average sector-specific coyote fees using the strongly balanced panel of sectors from 1995-
2011. The regression also includes between effects to account for different responses to border-wide variations in each sector. 
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Table 22: Coyote fees regressed with enforcement in neighboring sectors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
      
Agents Per Mile 2.338 2.036 188.1 -5.149 -4.961 
 (3.103) (3.363) (152.9) (4.929) (15.83) 
Average Agents Per Mile in Neighboring 
Sectors 
47.39*** 
(9.375) 
46.56*** 
(12.01) 
43.97*** 
(11.98) 
50.52*** 
(11.25) 
50.94*** 
(10.42) 
Average Prison Term 32.78*** 31.76*** -18.71 34.04*** -41.07 
 (7.712) (7.738) (45.19) (8.563) (39.22) 
Wage Differential 0.434*** 0.431*** 0.409*** 0.378** 0.375** 
 (0.158) (0.161) (0.157) (0.159) (0.162) 
Age -1.848 -1.785 -1.086 -1.509 -1.289 
 (5.014) (5.025) (4.918) (5.021) (5.056) 
Sex -125.9 -119.1 -109.4 -145.5 -143.1 
 (165.8) (167.7) (169.5) (161.5) (160.1) 
Education (yrs) -38.18*** -38.18*** -35.48*** -37.03*** -35.30** 
 (13.77) (13.68) (12.79) (13.82) (13.99) 
Migration Experience -17.84* -17.56* -14.69 -18.67* -17.25* 
 (10.05) (9.954) (9.937) (9.946) (9.801) 
Crossed Alone? 160.1** 162.3** 174.1** 161.7** 162.8** 
 (77.32) (77.60) (77.59) (75.75) (75.45) 
Migrant Operation Dummy  -8.333 362.6***   
  (131.3) (138.1)   
Coyote Operation Dummy  119.9 -645.9   
  (118.3) (1,035)   
Migrant Operation Dummy   -71.02***   
   (27.48)   
Coyote Operation Dummy   -115.2   
   (150.7)   
Prison Operations    69.47 -1,351* 
    (122.3) (758.1) 
Prison Operations Interaction   49.58  76.15* 
   (45.77)  (39.60) 
Migrant Operations    107.7 118.3 
    (89.53) (103.6) 
Coyote Operations    203.4* 144.2 
    (107.3) (140.4) 
Migrant Operations Interaction     -4.112 
     (15.76) 
Coyote Operations Interaction     4.998 
     (8.677) 
Constant 91.89 14.95 417.6 -53.51 1,335* 
 (175.8) (218.0) (1,037) (245.2) (760.2) 
      
Observations 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 1,054 
R-squared 0.157 0.157 0.168 0.166 0.168 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This is a regression of average sector coyote fees against sector agents, prison, wage differentials and enforcement operations 
that target coyotes from 1995 to 2011. Regressions (1) and (2) feature a dummy variable for coyotes. (3) and (4) show summations 
of these operations. Prison operations omitted for multicollinearity in regressions (1) and (2). The average of agents per mile in 
neighboring sectors is the average across both the two sectors to the east and west of each sector. Only one sector used for sectors 
next to oceans.
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Figure 1: Border Enforcement Sectors
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Figure 10: Real Coyote Fees by Border Enforcement Sector 
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See Figure 9 for values.
